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Introduction 
Julian Reiss has written a masterful paper that brings together the insights of many 
philosophers of economics of the last three decades (Reiss 2012). In doing so, he exposes an 
uncomfortable and important truth – that the consensus view, to the extent it exists, is not just 
unstable but also contradictory. It tries to serve too many gods, have its cake and eat it too. 
We fully agree with most of what Reiss says and we hope that his paper reaches a wide 
audience. The issues he raises extend beyond philosophy of economics and should be of 
concern to anyone interested in scientific models and their role in explanation. 
 
Reiss poses the following trilemma: 
1) Economic models are false 
2) Economic models are nevertheless explanatory 
3) Only true accounts explain 
We will focus here on our main point of disagreement, namely the trilemma’s second horn. In 
particular, we deny that economic models are explanatory.
2
 It seems to us that this is much 
the weakest link in Reiss’s argument. We begin by reiterating briefly why economic models 
are indeed not explanatory, then give reasons why intuitions to the contrary should be 
distrusted, before exploring why such mistaken intuitions might arise in the first place. 
 
Economic models do not explain 
Reiss himself makes clear why explanations offered by economic models do not satisfy the 
criteria laid down by any current theory of scientific explanation. First, they do not qualify as 
causal explanations because they are false and therefore do not identify any actual causes. 
This is the most important claim since, as Reiss rightly notes, causal explanation is by far the 
most popular candidate for the notion of explanation appropriate to economics. But economic 
models equally fall foul of other theories of explanation too. An insightful section of Reiss’s 
paper (pp56-9) shows just why such models do not explain according to a unificationist 
theory such as Philip Kitcher’s. Meanwhile, not stating laws, or at least not any that are 
empirically vindicated in the necessary way, they also clearly do not explain in the deductive-
nomological sense. 
 
There is no refuge, either, in the notion of mathematical explanation. Perhaps, for instance, it 
might be thought that the Hotelling model demonstrates the mathematical reason why two 
firms locate next to each other, much as statistical mechanics demonstrates the mathematical 
reason why with overwhelming probability heat will flow from hot air to cold. But, first, the 
notion of mathematical explanation of physical facts is contentious and the subject of much 
current debate.
3
 And, second, in any case it is agreed by all that to be considered seriously 
mathematical explanations require empirical confirmation of precisely the kind that is 
typically absent in economic cases. 
 
                                                          
1
 The authors are jointly and equally responsible for the content of this comment. 
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 Throughout, by ‘economic models’ we mean the idealized rational choice models characteristic of 
contemporary mainstream economics. 
3
 See, for instance, recent work by Bob Batterman, Chris Pincock, Mark Colyvan and Otavio Bueno. 
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In one way, therefore, the discussion ends already: according to all relevant philosophical 
theory, economic models do not count as explanatory. We are therefore licensed, indeed 
obliged, to reject intuitions to the contrary. Nevertheless, as Reiss observes, in a sense this is 
just to restate his trilemma rather than to resolve it, for even if pro-explanatory intuitions are 
mistaken, still they themselves need to be explained away. To this end, we begin by exploring 
further why they should indeed be distrusted. 
 
Pro-explanatory intuitions are suspect 
The “models are isolations” story long defended by Uskali Maki and “models state 
capacities” view of the early Nancy Cartwright are of no help here, as Reiss correctly points 
out. He states three reasons for why idealizing assumptions in economic models are not 
sufficiently similar to Galilean idealizations (pp51-2): (1) the former are conspicuously 
present in the model, while the latter are absent in a Galilean thought experiment; (2) 
Galilean idealizations are quantitative, not categorical; and (3) Galilean idealizations have a 
natural zero. Reiss concludes: “therefore we do not know where to look for ‘truth in the 
model’” (52). 
 
We agree with the conclusion but not the reasons. Why should (1), (2) and (3) a priori 
preclude an isolation or a capacity interpretation of a model? They do not. Instead, the 
fundamental problem is that we have no empirical evidence for thinking that the models are 
successful at isolating capacities. If models did succeed in doing so, we would be able to do 
the things with economic models that we are able to do with Galilean thought experiments, 
that is, combine their insights with our knowledge of disturbing factors in a given 
environment to predict results. An honest look at experimental and design economics, our 
only opportunities for genuine tests of microeconomic models, reveals that this is not what 
happens. Whenever model-based causal claims are made, experimentalists quickly find that 
these claims do not hold under disturbances that were not written into the model. Our own 
stock example is from auction design – models say that open auctions are supposed to foster 
better information exchange leading to more efficient allocation. Do they do that in general? 
Or at least under any real world conditions that we actually know about? Maybe. But we 
know that introducing the smallest unmodelled detail into the setup, for instance 
complementarities between different items for sale, unleashes a cascade of interactive effects. 
Careful mechanism designers do not trust models in the way they would trust genuine 
Galilean thought experiments (Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and Northcott 2009). Nor 
should they. This is why economic models do not deserve the honorific ‘capacity’. 
 
When successful causal-economic explanations are achieved, it turns out that it is not 
economic models that do the explaining but rather good old-fashioned experiment-tested 
causal hypotheses. Sure, these hypotheses are inspired by models, and models do get credit 
for this inspiration. But they don’t get credit for explanation. Reiss thus correctly classifies 
our view as denying models an explanatory role. He notes: “In the context of preparing 
experiments for policy, models may well serve the heuristic function Alexandrova describes. 
To be fair, she does not claim more than that.” (54). In fact, though, we are fully prepared to 
claim more than that. The use of models in mechanism design is a very good test for a 
philosophical account of models, because it is such a high stakes case (as well as for other 
reasons – see below). It is really important to get an auction right. And when it doesn’t go 
right, its failure is much more obvious and costly than a failure of the Hotelling model to 
explain, say, the polarization of US politics. When push comes to shove, as it does in 
mechanism design, models are not treated as explanatory. 
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As a general matter, the economics profession is known for its ‘casual empiricism’. As the 
name suggests, it involves scoring explanatory victories casually rather than by relying on 
econometric or experimental tests. Often this involves nothing more than drawing a vague 
and intuitively appealing analogy between the model and the phenomenon. For example, the 
famous Prisoners’ Dilemma game is often invoked in cases of a price war between, say, two 
gasoline stations located opposite each other. In cases like this, appeal to vague similarities 
between the model and the phenomenon is often the beginning and end of the ‘explanation’. 
A more high profile example of casual empiricism can be found in the press release of the 
Nobel prize committee, which stated that Thomas Schelling’s “analysis of strategic 
commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of 
firms to the delegation of political decision power” (Nobel 2005, italics added). Yet 
Schelling’s models, for all their importance, have not scored any major predictive or 
experimental successes. 
 
The auction case, by contrast, is significant as it is a rare one within economics of precisely 
such success. Rather than casual empiricism, instead a particular intervention demonstrably 
led to markedly increased revenues plus a range of other benefits. So we should take much 
more seriously the lessons from the auction case than from any number of casual Hotelling 
ones. 
 
The details of the Hotelling model, moreover, show well the flimsiness of any understanding 
or explanation it is alleged to provide. First, its predictions are not borne out fully. For 
instance, two competing political parties typically do not have identical platforms, nor do 
competing stores typically locate right next to each other. At best, then, the model is 
incompletely or partially explanatory. Second, the predictions are typically qualitative rather 
than quantitative. This makes it hard to assess precisely to what degree the model is 
explanatory.
4
 But perhaps the most important worry, third, is one that Reiss himself discusses 
extensively (pp52-3), namely the lack of robustness of the model’s predictions with respect to 
variation in its assumptions. For instance, the very small tweak of changing from a linear to a 
quadratic cost function completely reverses the Hotelling model’s predictions regarding firm 
location!
5
 This lack of robustness is worth dwelling on. Consider: the model is alleged to 
yield us an intuitive understanding of why firms locate close to each other, or of analogous 
phenomena in other fields such as politics. Yet a minor tweak to an assumption presumably 
peripheral to that intuition completely reverses the result. This suggests that in fact we have a 
rather poorer intuitive grasp of what really explains the result than we had thought. 
 
Another issue supports our general scepticism here. Economic models frequently invoke, as 
Reiss notes, entities that do not exist, such as perfectly rational agents, perfectly inelastic 
demand functions, and so on. As economists often defensively point out, other sciences too 
invoke non-existent entities, such as the frictionless planes of high-school physics. But there 
is a crucial difference: the false-ontology models of physics and other sciences are 
empirically constrained. If a physics model leads to successful predictions and interventions, 
its false ontology can be forgiven, at least for instrumental purposes – but such successful 
                                                          
4
 Northcott (forthcoming-b) discusses the notion of degree of explanation invoked here. It argues, among other 
things, that in order for such degree of explanation even to be assessed, a model must make a quantitative 
prediction about the value of an effect variable. This is a different complaint to Reiss’s own objection to the 
non-quantitative nature of the Hotelling model’s predictions. 
5
 Even if a model’s main results were robust to changes in its assumptions, still it is dubious that this kind of 
robustness would vindicate it in any important way (Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011). But the point here is 
that the Hotelling model can’t manage even this. 
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prediction and intervention is necessary for that forgiveness (Northcott forthcoming-a). The 
idealizations of economic models, by contrast, have not earned their keep in this way. So the 
problem is not the idealizations in themselves so much as the lack of empirical success they 
buy us in exchange. As long as this problem remains, claims of explanatory credit will be 
unwarranted. 
 
Finally, perhaps lessons can be learnt from the many areas of biology that are also 
characterized by idealized mathematical models. The explanatory status of these models is 
unclear in just the same way as in economics. One view is that in practice the models in 
biology serve to structure and inspire subsequent research by providing concepts and ideas 
but that they do not themselves tell us what to be realist about nor do they themselves explain 
(Pincock 2012, see also work by Jay Odenbaugh and Patrick Forber). Rather, it is only this 
subsequent research, often featuring close empirical study, that achieves explanations. This 
picture, of course, is more or less exactly the one we have argued is true for economics as 
well. Perhaps there can thus be a consilience between these two areas of philosophy of 
science. 
 
Where do the mistaken intuitions come from? 
So far, we have argued that economic models do not explain and that intuitions to the 
contrary are suspect. This combination implies the need for an error theory. In particular, why 
might such mistaken intuitions arise in the first place?  
 
Several overlapping possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that the word ‘explanation’ 
has many connotations. Most notable here is the longstanding distinction between epistemic 
and ontic conceptions of it (Salmon 1984). Very roughly, epistemic views emphasize that 
explanations reduce our surprise at an outcome, making it more evident to us why that 
outcome occurred. The ontic view, by contrast, analyzes explanations purely in terms of 
impersonal objective features. Causal explanation is usually taken to be the classic example 
of the latter kind, as it consists in identifying an effect’s cause, i.e. its place in the causal 
structure of the world, quite independent of any subjective or epistemic aspects. In the case of 
philosophy of economics, the causal view of explanation predominates, for good reason. It is 
common ground between Reiss and us that this is as it should be, so we will not defend that 
predominance here. 
 
The particular error theory is then that because economic models seem to lessen the surprise 
of an outcome this is erroneously taken to imply that they explain it. This appears to be a 
common reaction to the Hotelling model and the issue of firm location, for instance. Surprise 
being a subjective matter, perhaps the model does indeed lessen it. But such reactions are 
quite unreliable, as we have seen, as a guide to whether we have achieved any explanation in 
the causal sense. And if we are committed to causal explanation, that renders irrelevant mere 
surprise-lessening in itself – even if our intuitions have yet to take that on board.6 
 
Move on now to a second possible source of mistaken intuitions: the notorious ease with 
which humans conjure up after-the-fact rationalizations and illusions of success. Whenever 
we observe something consistent with the stylized claims of an idealized model it is 
correspondingly all too tempting to leap to the conclusion that that thing is explained by the 
model. Situations that force us to go beyond such treacherous psychological triggers are 
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 It seems to us that Reiss’s paper itself conflates these two senses of explanation, or at least deviates from its 
commitment to the causal view, when it endorses the intuition that the Hotelling model is indeed explanatory 
(pp48-9). 
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therefore essential test cases. This is the value of the auction case study, as the need to 
construct a successful intervention short-circuited all lazy talk about what the theoretical 
models might be achieving. 
 
Reiss himself discusses the shakiness – because insufficiently constrained – of judgments of a 
world’s credibility (p56). Yet it seems to us that exactly his complaints apply equally to 
judgments of explanatoriness too! Indeed, his reasons for dismissing credibility intuitions as 
explanatory arguably go a long way towards providing the error theory that we are seeking. 
Reiss insists that credibility judgments arise out of economists’ training and socialization in 
the discipline. Yet surely so too do judgments of explanation. Consider the evidence that the 
more game theory one studies the more one begins to see social interactions as games.
7
 And 
once one sees social interactions as games, it is all the more tempting to treat game theory as 
explanatory. 
 
As Reiss correctly points out, many economic models, Hotelling’s included, are widely seen 
to be explanatory and ‘feel’ explanatory. But it is worth asking who, apart from economists 
and those close to the discipline (for example, philosophers and historians of economics), 
share these feelings? The relevant contrast class here is not laypeople but rather other social 
scientists who study the same phenomena but with different theoretical tools. Do they also 
feel the explanatory pull of economic models? Do they feel this pull to the same degree as 
economists? We do not know. 
 
Our third strand of thinking in this section is to reflect on the origin of explanatory intuitions 
in general, not just within economics. The empirical study of these feelings by cognitive 
science is in its infancy. Still, it appears that there exists a kind of ‘explanatory 
phenomenology’ – a phrase coined by Alison Gopnik to describe the ‘aha’ feeling shared by 
children and scientists alike (Gopnik 2000). This phenomenology might even constitute a 
basic emotion that, like other basic emotions, has an evolutionary purpose. Gopnik’s view 
(300)
 is that “explanation is to theory-formation as orgasm is to reproduction. It is the 
phenomenological mark of the fulfilment of an evolutionarily determined drive … we 
experience orgasms and explanations to ensure that we make babies and theories.”8 (By 
‘theories’ Gopnik has in mind, roughly, maps of causal dependency relations.) This 
comparison of the feeling of explanation to orgasm motivates our scepticism about the 
evidentiary value of these feelings. We know better than to look for orgasm to make sure that 
reproduction happened. Similarly, we should know better than to look for ‘aha’ feelings to 
make sure that actual explanation happened. Especially in theoretical economics.
9
 
 
Conclusion 
We conclude that, given the many well founded worries above, there is more reason than ever 
to trust well established theories of explanation over mere intuitions about it, and to trust 
battle-tested auction successes over hazy after-the-fact rationalizations. And the verdict of 
these theories and trustworthy cases is clear – and negative. Economic models may give us 
orgasms, but they do not give us explanations. 
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 For evidence see Marwell and Ames (1981) and Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993). Or Reiss himself, 
approvingly (p49): “We begin to see Hotelling situations all over the place.” 
8
 It may be that only male orgasm has this evolutionary purpose (Lloyd 2005). 
9
 This is not to say that such feelings are entirely uninformative and should be discounted. Rather, they should 
be thought evidentiary but fallible. So when there is some evidence in their favour (that they are widely shared 
by intelligent economists) and some not (which we have marshalled in this paper), we must weigh things up. It 
will be clear by now where in our opinion the balance lies. 
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